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I. 
1. "Humanae Vitae" and Natural Law: Introductory Remarks 
The encyclical "Humanae Vitae" teaches that contraception violates 
natural law. "Natural law" however is a rational standard for dividing 
actions into "good" and "bad" ones - a standard springing from man's 
natural reason - and that's why it is first of all a philosophical issue. In 
order to show that contraception is the wrong thing to do for everybody, I 
think, the basic argument will therefore be an argument on the 
philosophical level. Yet, the encyclical's "Humanae Vitae" aim was to teach 
authoritatively the Church's doctrine about true responsible parenthood -
but not to give a thorough rational argument for its substantiation. As far as 
natural law is concerned, this has to be assigned to further philosophical-
ethical analysis. To provide such an analysis and to offer a proper natural-
law argument against contraception is the aim of this paper. 
Someone might nevertheless object that there is a rational and 
philosophically relevant argumentation contained in the encyclical itself. 
Admittedly, "Humanae Vitae" not only pronounces some ethically relevant 
anthropological principles but also includes arguments which obviously are 
aiming at justifying these principles, as well as it draws pretty concrete 
moral conclusions from them. The fundamental contention asserts that 
contraception violates natural law and that for this very reason it 
contradicts God's will and His loving design over man. But does "Humanae 
Vitae" provide an answer to the question why contraception violates 
natural law? 
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Surprisingly, most cntlclsm of "Humanae Vitae" was based on the 
assumption that the very wording of the encyclical actually did provide such 
an answer, and that this answer was simply derived from a naturalistic and 
"biological" understanding of natural law. According to these critics, 
"Humanae Vitae" teaches that the biological patterns inherent in the 
human generative faculty must never be acted against, but respected. 
"This", a well known critic has asserted, "is undoubtedly the philosophy 
underpinning the argumentation of the whole encyclical. It goes so far as to 
declare biological laws as absolutely binding on the conscience of man".) 
Interpreting "Humanae Vitae" in this way, its critics had an easy job in 
rejecting its doctrine. But a careful look at the encyclical's text will give 
evidence that it never identifies "natural biological laws" with natural law in 
the moral sense. Talking in No. 10 about the biological forces of man's 
procreative faculty, "Humanae Vitae" mentions therewith only the first and 
basic requirement of responsible parenthood: the requirement of knowing 
what is going on with one's body and that the laws of this body and its 
sexual drives belong to the self of human personality. But other exigencies 
of responsible parenthood are added immediately: The requirement of 
exerting dominion by reason and will over one's "innate drives and 
emotions"; the requirement of either "prudently and generously" deciding 
"to have a large family" or, "for serious reasons and with due respect to the 
moral law", choosing "to have no more children for the time being or even 
for an indeterminate period"; finally the requirement of integration of all 
these aspects into the "0 bjective moral order instituted by God, - the order 
of which a right conscience is the true interpreter". Up to this point 
obviously nothing has been determined about what the requirements of this 
"objective moral order" concretely are. 
In its No. II the encyclical mentions the "laws of nature and the 
incidence of fertility" which, as a sign of God's wisdom, are granting a 
certain spacing of births. Yet, "Humanae Vitae" does not contend thereby 
that these "laws" are instituting a moral order; that is, that they are 
"natural law" in the moral sense. The existence of biological rhythms of 
fertility is mentioned at this place but to draw a fundamental conceptual 
distinction: The distinction between voluntarily induced infertility and 
naturally given infertility. While the first poses a moral problem, the 
second does not. "Humanae Vitae" obviously wants to teach at this point 
that the conjugal act performed in naturally (non-voluntary) sterile 
periods is pervectly licit; that non-intentional (naturally given) sterility of 
the procreative faculty does not deprive sexual intercourse from its 
intrinsic value and dignity as expression of marital love and , finally , that 
the spacing of births resulting from fertility cycles may be considered as a 
sign of the Creator's wisdom. Notwithstanding that, absolutely no reason 
is intended to be given here for settling the question why voluntarily 
induced sterility is illicit. At this point the encyclical pronounces nothing 
but its fundamental teaching that each conjugal act must remain "per se" 
open to procreation ("ut quilibet matrimonii usus ad vitam humanam 
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procreandam per se destinatus permaneat"), which in the very context 
means: It must not be impeded voluntarily to have those procreative 
consequences which would result from its naturally given (physiological) 
conditions (according to which procreation is not always possible). Thus, 
the encyclical wants to show that "openness to procreation" is not a 
physical , but an intentional category. 2 But it is not yet pronounced why 
this "openness" is a moral requirement. 
Only in the following No.12 the encyclical starts arguing that this 
doctrine is based on the inseparable connection, established by God, of the 
two fundamental meanings of the conjugal act. "Humanae Vitae", now, 
teaches four things: First that human sexuality has two fundamental 
meanings : the meaning of loving union of the spouses ("unitive meaning") 
and the meaning of transmission of human life ("procreative meaning"). 
Secondly, that according to the design of the Creator these two meanings 
are inseparably connected. Thirdly, that man on his own initiative may not 
break this connection. And fourthly , "Humanae Vitae" affirms that by 
contraception the connection of these two meanings in fact is broken. 
'Inseparability Principle' Must Be Understood 
The first, second and third one - which jointly form what I shall call the 
Inseparability Principle - must first be rightly understood so as to deal 
correctly with the last question. The widespread criticism of "Humanae 
Vitae" was and still is the one contesting that contraception in fact does 
break the connection of these two meanings while periodic continence 
does not. Critics thereby contend that the connection of these two 
meanings need not be maintained in each single conjugal act. Therewith 
they answer in the affirmative a question explicitly brought up by the 
encyclical itself (No.3) . "Could it not be admitted ( ... ) that procreative 
finality applies to the totality of married life rather than to each single act?" 
Critics give their affirmative answer to this question by opposing what 
"Humanae Vitae" explicitly teaches in No. 14. The claim was , to put it even 
clearer, that a s long as contraception is adopted in the context of a marital 
life which is open in its totality to its procreative meaning - that is, as long 
as contraception serves only as a means for responsibly limiting or 
planning offspring without excluding offspring on principle, there would 
not result any breaking of the connection of the two meanings of the 
conjugal act ("Totality Principle"). Moreover, intentional openness to 
procreation would be fully maintained. To refer to the Inseparability 
Principle in order to show the wrongness of contraception, critics contend, 
would be mere question begging. 
By faithfull y following this view, critics of the encyclical's teaching 
thought, and still think, that periodic continence is only another method of 
contraception, the one being a "natural method", the other an "artificial 
method". This concentration on the alternative "natural" or "artificial 
method" has been a fatally misleading move; it has led many to miss the 
very point at issue and to overlook the crux of the problem. Misled in this 
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way, they were induced to promote an interpretation according to which 
"Humanae Vitae" condemns contraception because of its artificial 
character, because of its shortcoming with respect to naturally given 
structures. But does "Humanae Vitae" give us any arguments to refute this 
false interpretation? 
In my opinion, "Humanae Vitae" did not intend to show why 
contraception violates the Inseparability Principle; it only affirms that it 
does. Likewise , "Humanae Vitae" did not intend to provide a 
philosophical (ethical) reason why contraception violates natural law; it 
only wanted to affirm that is does. Nor does "Humanae Vitae" explicitly 
refer to any definite natural law concept. It applies, in the light of 
revelation (Holy Scripture and Tradition), its perennial, prophetical 
teaching on the matter to new developments in the field of contraceptive 
devices without putting forward a properly philosophical argument,) 
However, there clearly exists a leading, phiosophically relevant 
perspective underlying the encyclical's teaching, a perspective which also 
reflects an important doctrinal development: This perspective is not to 
defend the demand of respecting natural patterns inherent in the biological 
or physiological constitution of man and his generative acts, but to stress 
what has been cal/ed4 the "intentionalness of the thing one is doing" by 
contracepting, an intentionalness which relates to the nature of the virtue 
of chastity and to its specific requirements within the context of 
procreative responsibility. This, I think, is the key to a proper 
understanding of the encyclical, which , in my opinion, leads to probably 
the only way of explaining why contraception violates natural law. 
2. Methodological specifications: The perspective of single acts and the 
'relevant case' 
Before I continue, I have to settle a fundamental methodological 
question. When "Humanae Vitae" talks about the procreative meaning of 
marital love it explicitly refers not only to marital life in its totality, but, as 
was already mentioned, to each single conjugal act. Thus, the perspective 
of "Humanae Vitae" consists in providing a moral judgement about a 
specific type of action. that is about concrete performance of human acts. 
In order to identify the act under question, a most important restriction 
has to be effected for methodological reasons . "Contraceptive behavior" is 
or can be a complex structure involving several aspects to be distinguished. 
The most typical and widespread case of contraceptive behavior consists in 
an overall attitude of excluding in part or totally procreative finality from 
marital love. In this case, which is the one of primary pastoral concern, 
contraceptive behavior has its root on the level of life plans and overall 
intentions involved in marital commitment. This life plan consists in 
wanting to exclude in part or totally the possible restrictions, burdens, etc. 
expected from or imposed by pregnancy and bringing up children, mostly 
as a result of other preferences. This is not a case of "reponsible 
parenthood", beca use parenthood itself is partly or totally rejected. Much 
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more they are acts of restricting or even suppressing the procreative 
meaning of marital love altogether. They are intentional acts of 
disconnecting in part or totally the unitive meaning of sexual behavior 
from its procreative function; spouses, in this case, simply close their 
minds , at least partially, to the task of generously transmitting human life. 
For this, however, contraception is not the only way, even if nowadays it 
may be the most commonly used; but periodic continence, too , can serve 
for such a project and is still doing it in some cases. The failure of this 
project, however, does not basically consist in contraceptive behavior 
itself, but already in the overall intention with which contraception and 
also periodic continence are adopted .5 
To identify the act of contraception in its "purity" -for analytical reasons, 
- we should therefore consider another case, which also is the one the 
encyclical "Humanae Vitae" is mostly concerned about: The proper case of 
responsible parenthood; the case of spouses who are plainly open to their 
parental vocation but for serious reasons, in which they detect God's will, 
conclude that they ought not to have any more children, at least for the time 
being. "Humanae Vitae" has perfectly sketched this situation when it states 
(N o. 16): "It cannot be denied that in each case married couples , for 
acceptable reasons, are both perfectly clear in their intention to avoid 
children and mean to make sure that none will be born." According to the 
encyclical's teaching, periodic continence would be perfectly licit in this 
case; contraception, however, would not. In this case, one and the same 
upright intention leads to a different choice of actions . The intention here is 
not to disconnect marital love from its procreative meaning. On the 
contrary: The insight of spouses - "We should not have another child" or 
"She (I) should not become pregnant" - which is based on serious and 
justified reasons, is an insight plainly imbedded in the parental and 
procreative meaning of marital love; in both cases, it forms an intention of 
avoiding conception (as long as present circumstances, etc. continue), 
which is integrated in the very context of procreative responsibility. 
Afterwards, however, the choice of conduct, that is, the means chosen 
for the sake of avoiding conception, will be different: The contraceptive 
choice is a volition to act in a way of preventing sexual intercourse from 
being fertile (it is a choice to prevent conception where it is foreseen to 
occur, for the sake of avoiding it). The choice of periodic continence, on 
the other hand, does not involve the volition of preventing naturally fertile 
acts from being fertile , but of avoiding conception by abstaining from 
those acts which are foreseen to bring about the consequence of 
conception. Why is the former choice wrong, while the latter is not? That 
exactly, and only that, is the question which has to be answered. All the 
other possible reasons additionally provided to show that contraception 
involves moral disorder actually presuppose having resolved this basic 
problem. 
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3. Some known arguments against contraception 
It seems to be useful to talk first about several arguments which intend 
to defend the doctrine of "Humanae Vitae". The analysis of these 
arguments will help to further clear up the point at issue . 
The most traditional of these arguments is the "perverted faculty 
argument". held times ago by many of those who some years later rejected 
the Church's teaching as it was pronounced in "Humanae Vitae". It is both 
amazing and sad to see how most critics of"Humanae Vitae" did hold this 
kind of naturalistic theory till quite recently. Later on. some of them began 
to consider the "pill" as not violating the integrity of naturally given 
structures by assuming that the ovulation-inhibiting pill does nothing but 
provoke "artificially" what nature often does spontaneously; but in the 
generative faculty. they have asserted. nothing is mutilated and there is no 
vitiation in the performance of the procreative act. b Others , abandoning 
this rather "naturalistic" way of moral thinking, wholly stopped talking 
about "integrity of the generative faculty" and fully subscribed to licitness 
of contraceptual practices whatsoever. though without giving up a rather 
crudely "physicalist" if not "zoological" view of sexuality .1 When they 
finally read "Humanae Vitae", they obviously did not understand that the 
encyclical's view was quite a different one. Backed up by mass medias, they 
persistently spread the reproach - though without really proving it on the 
grounds of the wording of "Humanae Vitae"H - that the perspective 
underlying the encyclical's teaching was just this biological concept of 
morally binding natural patterns which, as they rightly emphasized, in the 
meantime the majority of moral theologians had given up. 
I think there is no need at present of explicitly refuting the "perverted 
faculty argument" or similar arguments grounded in the need of respecting 
natural patterns (in the physiological sense). No serious moralist holds it 
nowadays even if critics of"Humanae Vitae" continue to be convinced that 
this is what the encyclical really teaches. What Germain Grisez wrote many 
years ago about it is still worthwhile being remembered: 
'The naturally given structure of the sexual act' - that is a phrase one often 
encounters in discussions of contraception. The contention here is that there is no 
such thing, if we are talking about the human ocr; for human acts have their 
structure from intelligence. Just insofar as an action is considered according to its 
naturally given structure. it is to that extent not considered as a human acl- i.e .. as 
a moral act - but rather as a physiological process or as instinctive behavior. 
Action with a given structure and acts structured by intelligence differ as totally as 
nature differs from morality. Nature has an order which reason can consider but 
cannot make and cannot alter. Morality has an order which reason institutes by 
guiding the acts of the will· 
I fully subscribe to this criticism, liking to add that acting against nature 
does not automatically imply moralfault; it has always to be shown why a 
violation of natural patterns is wrong; "agere contra naturam" is not equal 
to "peccare contra naturam". A reason has always to be given why a 
violation of nature - e.g. , of the course of the body's natural processes - has 
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or has not moral relevance; that is, how it has to be qualified from a moral 
point of view.1O Why is contraceptive sexual intercourse not just like 
rendering "a man's eating non-nutritive for a day or two", or like installing 
"a substitute for lung-breathing by some reversible operation (with a view 
to underwater exploration, say)" or like chewing sugarless gum for the 
pleasure of chewing, excluding nutrition as the "natural goal" of 
chewing?" Thus, an argument against contraception on the grounds of 
referring to the naturally given structure of the sexual act does not resolve 
anything; it simply begs the question , - provided that one does not want 
to maintain that what is naturally given imposes in all cases the moral 
obligation of not altering it ; which plainly would lead to absurd 
consequences. Every argument which tries to defend naturally given 
structures from being altered by human intervention needs a further 
argument which precisely may not be based on the very "naturalness" of 
natural patterns, but which needs to be an additional ethical argument 
showing the moral relevance of natural patterns.'2 
A second argument is the one I will call the "creationist argument". It 
runs as follows: In procreation man is a cooperator with God, Who in 
every act of generation immediately creates the human soul. Through 
contraception man overrides God's right as a creator, contradicts His 
creative will, and claims for himself to be the master over human life . 
This argument obviously applies to anti-procreative overall-intentions, 
because these aim at withdrawing marital love from its procreative 
meaning, that is, from its meaning as cooperation with God's creative love. 
Foreclosing the procreative meaning of marital love means overriding 
God's creative designs over man and falsifying one's own situation as a 
mere cooperator with God. 
In the case we are considering, however, this argument seems to lead to 
serious difficulties. Consider: The case presupposes the spouses' insight 
that they "ought not to have another child at present". And this "ought 
not" is ajudgment of conscience which the spouses - supposing they take 
conscience seriously - will interpret as God's will. According to the 
teaching of the II Vatican Council's pastoral constitution "Gaudium et 
spes" (No. 50), the spouses are not only cooperators with God's creative 
and loving will , but they also are "interpreters of God's love". Hence, their 
task is to cooperate with God's creative love precisely by interpreting what 
this love wants them to do; it is assigned to them to judge in conscience 
whether God wants the coming-to-be of a new human being under the 
present circumstances of their conjugal life; what equals to judging 
whether God at present wants to make use of their loving union creating a 
new human being. Our case supposes that spouses rightly have come to the 
conclusion that God, at present , does not want them to have another child ; 
this conclusion fully involves the consciousness of being both cooperaters 
with God and interpreters of His creative love. 
Now, if procreation were the only meaning of the conjugal act , 
consequently they should abstain even completely from sexual intercourse. 
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But they know that procreation is not the only meaning inherent in 
sexuality. They may engage in sexual intercourse to express mutual love 
even if God wants them to avoid pregnancy for the time being or even 
altogether. "If we contracept - they might argue - we shall not necessarily 
deprive sexual intercourse from its cooperative meaning; we only will 
deprive it from its procreative efficiency. And this - they might assert - we 
are allowed to do according to God's will, for we know that He wants us to 
avoid pregnancy." Referring at this point to the cooperative aspect of 
procreation to refute them, would signify to beg the question; it simply is 
not sufficient, because one has not yet proven why depriving intercourse 
from its procreative efficency is not an appropriate meansfor cooperating 
with God's will of avoiding conception; that is , why it is not an appropriate 
interpretation of how to cooperate with God's creative love. To show this, 
one should provide reasons for the wrongness ofthe contraceptive act and 
only then derive its implications for cooperation with God 's creative love. 
Someone might object: In every act of sexual intercourse which by its 
natural condition is fertile and therefore a procreative act , God's creative 
intervention is "automatically" involved. Consequently man has no right 
to render it infertile; for this would be equal to setting limits to God's 
creative power, impeding what only He has a right to dispose of. Man 
would usurp the place of God. 
To this I should answer: Even if the acts of procreation are, by their very 
object, acts of cooperation with the Creator and have therefore to be 
considered as something like "God's property", it would not be evident at 
all why rendering them infertile by reasons of "procreative responsibility" 
should be considered as overriding God's rights. This could be evidenced 
only by assuming that through the conjugal act God wants to create a new 
human being also in the case of spouses whom at present He wants to 
avoid conception. This assumption, however, clearly is self-contradictory, 
for it implies God's creative will to be inconsistent. Or else it implies that, 
for executing His creative will , God is confined by secondary causes (like 
the body's fertility-rhythms). Provided both that God at present wants 
spouses to avoid conception and that He fully approves the unitive 
meaning of intercourse , it seems much more plausible to suppose that He 
does not request single conjugal acts either to keep their actual meaning of 
cooperation with a divine act of creation (whether this supposition is 
actually sound is precisely the point at issue) . This assumption however 
can be reasonably argued for on the grounds that spouses kno w that God 
does not want to create at present and in their very case a new human life 
through their bodily acts, and that the procreative meaning is not the only 
meaning of the conjugal act. The only way of saving, at this point, the 
creationist argument would be by assuming that what God wants spouses 
to do is conditioned by natural patterns; but this is plainly absurd , or at 
least it will lead back to the "perverted faculty argument". 
Henceforth , the creationist argument will "bite back". For the 
contraceptive choice could be justified just on the grounds of "cooperation 
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with the Creator", which requires the responsible interpretation of His 
will. So it might be asserted that the cooperative meaning of procreation at 
present demands an act which prevents intercourse from having 
procreative consequences. Thus, one could, without any peril of 
inconsistency, assume that cooperation with God's will demands now to 
alter a natural pattern for the very sake of fulfilling God's will; an 
assumption which, again, is the one at issue. Whoever wants to refute this 
contention without being forced to resort to the "perverted faculty 
argument" , should give a further reason which precisely should not be 
drawn from the cooperative meaning of procreation. 
To sum up: Contracepting spouses will concede that by contraception 
they withdraw sexual intercourse from being involved in a divine act of 
creation. but this, they will argue, they do according to God's will. 
Therefore. what has to be proven is why, in order to fulfill God's will of 
avoiding conception, it is illicit both to prevent conception (on the 
secondary-cause-level) and consequently to thereby withdraw the conjugal 
act from involvement in the primary-cause's creative act. 
So the crucial problem remains far from being resolved. To bring moral 
reasoning to a satisfactory and definite solution, the creationist argument 
obviously needs a complement. The very crux of the problem is, why the 
act of preventing sexual acts from being fertile is not an appropriate means 
for responsi bly cooperating with God. Nobody denies that man has no 
right to override the Creator's prerogatives , but the crucial question to be 
answered is: Whr is the Creators right overridden by contraception? The 
reason can be worked out only by giving evidence why contraception in 
itself is a wrong means for fulfilling procreative responsibility and thus for 
cooperating with God's creative will. 
The creationist argument only manifests the real :;ravity of 
contraception. once thi s practice has been understood in its intrinsic 
wrongness and its contradiction to the demands of the human good . 
Moreover. it points out the real gravity of contraception pursued in the 
context of the intent of withdrawing marital love from procreative context 
I\ ·hatel'er. Indeed, we are allowed to argue that spouses have no right to do 
this. because the task of procreation and the bodily acts which render it 
possible are not at man's disposal ; they are but realities through which man 
cooperates with the Creator. Life is not "made" by men , but "given" by 
God through the act of conjugal love. And this spreading out of His divine 
creative love is just what God on principle wants married people to 
cooperate with. Hence. this is different from the case in which spouses have 
reasons of procreative responsibility for the supposition that God at 
present does not want to make use of their marital intercourse to spread 
the gift of life . Thus. as an argument which refers to "God's rights" within 
the context of "responsible parenthood", the creationist argument seems 
to fall short of resolving the problem at issue. It overlooks the need for a 
moral analysis on the level of the human act which would make out the 
"good for man". according to Aquinas's famous dictum : "Non enim Deus 
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a nobis offenditur nisi ex eo quod contra nostrum bonum agimus"l3 . 
A further argument is the one which I would like to call the "Contralife-
will argument". 14 It intends to show that in the contraceptive act in and of 
itself is involved a "contralife will", somewhat similar to a homicidal will. 
This argument which, in its exposition is very sophisticated, needs to be 
further examined , I think. I have some doubts about the soundness of its 
basic assumption, which holds that in and of itself the contraceptive act is 
not intentionally related to sexual acts and seeks nothing but "to impede 
the beginning of a person's life". 
Let me make only a few insufficient remarks: What the argument 
claims, I think, would be true only if children came into being 
spontaneously; adopting a device which impedes this would then 
intentionally be nothing but "impeding the beginning of a person's life". 
But babies come into being as a consequence of a human (sexual) act. 
Taking, for example, an ovulation-inhibiting pill does, in itself, not impede 
babies to come into being; it only impedes ovulation. You cannot take it 
with the intention of impeding the beginning of a baby's life, unless you 
simultaneously choose to engage in sexual intercourse and for this reason 
you choose to prevent intercourse from causing a baby's life by inhibiting 
ovulation. Therefore, as it seems to me, contraception only seeks to 
prevent sexual intercourse from causing the beginning of a person's life . 
Thus, insofar as intentional relation to "the beginning of new life" is 
concerned, the volition involved in a contraceptive choice does not differ 
from the volition necessarily involved also in a choice to refrain from 
intercourse: In both cases one chooses "not to cause the initiation of new 
life". So it does not seem that the difference between contraception and 
periodic continence is due to their different intentional relation towards 
"the beginning of a person's life", but rather to their different 
intentional ness with regard to sexual activity and its being a possible cause 
of the initiation of new life. 
Finally there is the anthropological argument precisely based on the 
doctrine of the inseparable connection of the two meanings of the marital 
act. This doctrine, I think, is basic as a starting point and as the 
indispensable anthropological background for any argument against 
contraception. However, it does not seem to me to be an assumption 
sufficient for arguing that also in each single act of contraceptive 
intercourse, this connection is denied in a way essentially different from 
periodic continence . One might still object that periodic continence and 
the intentional limiting of sexual intercourse to infertile periods is simply 
another "method" - although not "artificial", but "natural" - of 
disconnecting sexual intercourse from its procreative meaning. To simply 
state that in contracepting one positively "does" something which 
"impedes" conception is not sufficient; it would be nothing but to beg the 
question or to resort to the "perverted faculty argument". Rather, it has to 
be shown why ''preventing intercourse from causing conception" violates 
the Inseparability Principle, while "abstaining from causing conception" 
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does not. It is exactly for this purpose that I intend to provide an argument. 
4. Description of the relevant case and description of the contraceptive 
choice 
In further analyses I shall concentrate on the problem of the 
contraceptive choice itself as a choice of a determinate sort of human act. 
The analysis has to be kept in the context of the mentioned case, which 
involves the following descriptive elements: 
I. The spouses' mora/~l ' uprighr inrention to avoid pregnancy. 
2. Consequently the fact that , in this case, periodic conrinence would be 
a licir alrernarive. 
3. The at least implicit choice nor 10 adopr periodic continence, that is, 
not to abstain from those acts which are foreseen to have procreative 
consequences. 
4. insread o(choosing periodic conrinence, the choice to adopt means 
which prel'enr possibly procreative consequences of all sexual intercourse 
performed in any moment. This means can be the "pill", as well as other 
chemical, mechanical or surgical techniques such as condoms, IUDs or 
sterilization, but also "natural" devices like coirus interruprus. On this level 
of argument , this all comes to the same conclusion. 
We are thus analyzing contraception as a type of human acr. For the 
present purpose, I will suggest the following description (definition) of the 
choice of this human act: A conrraceprive choice is rhe choice of an acr rhar 
prel'enrs/reelr consenred performances of sexual inrercourse, which are 
.foreseen 10 hGl'e procrearil'e consequences, from having rhese con-
sequences, and which is a choice madejusrfor rhis reason. It seems to me 
that thi s is a complete description of the contraceptive choice, and it does 
not matter whether it refers to contraception within or without marriage. 
It involves (I) the intention of engaging in sexual intercourse; (2) to foresee 
that this possibly may cause the initiation of new life; (3) to choose a 
performance which prevents this consequence of one's sexual behavior, 
and (4) to choose this precisely for the sake of preventing this procreative 
consequence. As already has been noted , this description also applies to 
onanism by "coitus interruptus", (because this is a device which prevents 
actual engaging in sexual intercourse from having procreative con-
sequences) and, on the other hand, it obviously applies mostly to surgical 
sterilization. It even covers abortion , insofar as abortion is meant to be 
part of a contraceptive policy, that is , insofar as abortion is previously 
prol'ided for "neutralizing" or undoing foreseen procreative consequences 
of sexual intercourse (in this case abortion involves both the contraceptive 
choice and the choice of killing an already existing human being). Notice 
that the description of contraception which I adopt is absolutely 
independent of what is happening on the physical level for , in order to 
resolve the problem at issue , it makes no difference whether one considers 
the case of preventing a performed sexual intercourse from being fertile by 
taking the pill or the case of interrupting intercourse so as to consummate 
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it in an onanistic way. Of course there are differences of other kinds, but 
they are not relevant in the present context. The suggested description also 
disregards the differentiation between "doing" and "refraining from 
doing", because coitus interruptus is a kind of "refraining" and because, 
moreover, this description obviously does not apply to adopting 
contraceptives to prevent possible procreative consequences of foreseen 
rape, for the raped person does not choose to engage in sexual intercourse 
or to prevent a possible consequence of its own sexual behavior. Thus , 
what I have called the "ethical context" is completely different. IS It does, 
however, apply to forced sexual intercourse between spouses, because 
marriage involves commitment to engage in the conjugal act. 
By adopting this description, we will be able to point out that the reason 
why contraception is wrong is not because it violates naturally given 
structures of the generative faculty or other "natural" la ws, for not every 
act of preventing conception implies such violations or inferences with 
natural processes , while others (such as taking an ovulation-inhibiting pill 
in fear of rape), which actually do imply it, are not covered by this 
description. 
I shall develop my argument in the following steps: 
I. A previous exposition of the anthropological meaning of the 
Inseparability Principles. This will lead to the definition of the object of 
sexual intercourse. This is the cornerstone of my argument. 
2. A clarification of what "procreative responsibility", as derived from 
the Inseparability Principle, means within the context of an ethical theory 
which is based on the concept of moral virtue. This step renders 
anthropological insights applicable to concrete human actions. 
3. The analysis of the difference between contraceptive intercourse and 
intercourse in the context of a practice of periodic abstinence as two 
radically different forms of sexual behavior, containing the proof of the 
objective disconnection of the two meanings of the conjugal act as 
resulting from contraception. This piece of action analysis forms the very 
core of my argument. 
4. The exposition of some intrinsic implications of contraception, 
mainly disintegration of sexuality and its consequences for marital love. 
This shows the gravity of the moral disorder implied in contraception. 
5. Finally, I shall point out why, by this argument , contraception has 
been shown to violate naturallaw. 
I would like to draw attention to the importance of the methodological 
order implied in the following way of proceeding. Equally, I wish to stress 
that I shall not derive an argument against contraception from the 
Inseparability Principle , but rather prove the very truth of this principle on 
the level of single performances of actions . The anthropology implied in 
the Inseparability Principle is nothing but the starting point of the 
argument and its cornerstone. The proper core of this argument, however, 
will be contained in the third step: the analysis of the morally relevant 
difference between periodic continence and contraceptive behavior. 
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Do allow me just one supplementary remark. I shall not be talking 
about "Natural Family Planning" (NFP). Besides other reasons, mainly 
because "natural" is a rather misleading term in this context, insinuating, 
though incidentally, a difference with "artificial". Instead of NFP, I will 
only talk about "periodic continence" and "procreative responsibility". On 
the other hand, periodic continence does not necessarily mean a 
"planning" of the family , but only for serious reasons of responsibility , the 
avoiding of offspring in determinate circumstances. 
II. 
1. The meaning of the Inseparability Principle, or the "object" of the 
marital act. 
Like all basic principles, the Inseparability Principle has to be "shown" 
rather than demonstrated. It is an anthropological principle expressing the 
fundamental unity of human persons as compound beings of body and 
spirit. In his consciousness, the acting person spontaneously possesses at 
least implicit awareness of this complex unity. A human person 
experiences its body and the body's acts as "his / her" body and "his / her" 
acts which belong to one's personal "self'. Metaphysical anthropology 
will, in a systematical way, elucidate this experience, coming to the 
following results: 
Man is essentially a bodily being and, as such a bodily being, he belongs 
to the genus of animals . At the same time, man is spirit as well. He is, as 
Aristotle says, an organized organic body animated by a spiritual soul; 
according to the terminology of the scholastics, he is animal rationale. The 
spiritual soul is the substantial form of a body which therefore is a 
substantial unity. Consequently, man's corporeality is fully integrated into 
the structure of spiritual life. It is "informed" by spiritual life , becoming 
however itself the subject or "carrier" of spiritual acts. 
So the acting human subject is always a body-spirit-unity. Human acts 
are not either spiritual or bodily acts nor are they acts of a spiritual 
substance that makes use of the body as its "instrument". Human acts are 
always, although in different ways, acts of body and spirit cooperating. 
Human acts therefore are, even in the case of properly inner acts of 
intelligence and will , always acts of a body, though of a spiritually 
informed body. Likewise human acts, even in the case of proper bodily 
acts, are always acts of a spirit, although of a bodily bound spirit , that is of 
a spirit which, by its own nature, is the substantial form of a body. Thus 
there is only one "suppositum" (real, existing individual thing), whose 
nature (or "essence") includes body and spirit and which we used to call the 
human person; (this entirely differs with the christological - hypostatical-
union of two natures in one person. Man, therefore, is not an "incarnated 
spirit".) 
This full integration of the body and its acts into the life of the spirit 
entails also the integration of the body into the structure of spiritual love, 
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· which is based.on free willand Iati.olla Ii.ty. (it.is dilectio) and whose proper-
act is free self-giving. 
Because of this fundamental substantial unity of body and spirit , human 
love is not only a spiritual reality, but also a corporal one (which also is 
valid for the love of God) . The spirit also talks the "language of the body", 
and it is a language proper to it because the spirit is by its very nature the 
substantial form (the soul) of the body. The body has to be considered as 
"subject", and not as "object" or "means" of spiritual love: The human 
body fully belongs to the subjectivity of the acting person. 
On the other hand, there is a simple fact based upon the bodily 
constitution of man : Propagation of the human species takes place 
through bodily acts of procreatian. Human procreation, therefare, is a 
basic human good (and nat .only a gaad an the physialagical level in the 
sense of a mere "natural" autcame .of a bialagical pracess). Pracreatian·is a 
basic human goad in the same extent as human life generally is , far the 
autcame .of the procreative pracess is nat simply a "living bady", but a 
living human person. Mareaver, because .of the substantial unity .of man, 
this act .of pracreatian cannat be discannected fram the spiritual 
dimensian .of the saul: the carporal act of procreatian necessarily acquires 
a spiritual dimension; the act .of human pracreatian is essentially a 
spiritual act as well. Being integrated in human nature , it is alsa spiritual 
lave. It is dilectio and therefare marked by the seal .of free mutual self-
giving .of two human persans. Otherwise we wauld encaunter a deep 
dichatamy within the structure .of the persan, a principle .of disintegratian 
.of its unity. We wauld have ta subscribe ta a kind .of dualistic 
anthrapalagy.16 Thus "Humanae Vitae" in Na. 10, rightly paints aut that 
the bialagicalla ws .of the generative faculty are nat .only a "biolagical" fact 
with which man meets while experiencing his badily drives, but alsa they 
are human goods belonging to the human personality. part .of man's 
persanal subjectivity (which explains the sametimes misunderstoad 
reference ta "Summa Thealagiae", I-II , 94,2).1 7 
Far the same reason , this spiritual act (love between male and female 
and its expression in the "language .of the bady") is baund ta the canditians 
.of the bady itself, because, as we have seen, the bady is subject. "carrier" .of 
spiritual acts. In every act .of pracreatian, spirit and bady are thus mutually 
correlated and cooperating; they are - strictly analagaus ta the matter-
farm campasitian an the antalagicallevel - cooperating principles in the 
act itself; they are twa caaperating principles fram which will yield in each 
case numerically one single human act. Sa, thraugh the spirit the bady 
acquires a new dimensian and thraugh the bady the spirit acquires a new 
dimensian as well. 
Fram this, several consequences result. In the case .of man, sexual acts 
are mare than simple sexual capulatian ta result in pracreatian. They 
essentially are acts .of free mutual self-giving .of twa laving persans. On the 
other hand , acts .of marital lave which cansist in recipracal self-giving, are 
in their bodily dimensian always acts .of "this" bady, and that entails: 
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they have a procreative meaning (nobody can den y this, unless rejecting a 
constitutive property of the body. By emphasizing this fact , however, one 
is not asse rting that every act of sexual copulation is, or should be 
procreatively effectual). 
On the grounds of this analysis , we are now equipped with the elements 
required to understand exactly the two meanings of the conjugal act , as 
well as the principle of their intrinsic connection. 
I . To be fully human, human procreation presupposes spiritual love. It 
presupposes the act of mutual self-giving. Human procreation has its place 
within the context of spiritual love which is the context of a community of 
persons (and not of "i nstinctive steering"). It is informed by the " logic" of 
this love in the same degree as the body is informed by spiritual life 
altogether. Procreation withdrawn from this context would not be fully 
human procreation anymore.,.but rather procreation of another kind ; e.g., 
animal or technical (even ifeffectuated by human beings as, for example, 
in vitro fertilization). 
2. By the same token, we may affirm: Love between male and female, 
insofar as it tends to be consummated in bodily union (that is, insofar as it 
springs from the "naturalis inciinatio ad coniunctionem maris et feminae", 
from sexual inclination),'b y its very nature possesses a procreative 
dimension , because it is love between two bodily constituted spiritual 
beings. In other words: the loving bodily union of male and female is , by its 
own nature, "service to transmission of life" . Of course there exist different 
forms of love between persons as well as different possible forms of love 
between human beings of different sexes (e.g., mere fellowship or love 
between brother and sister). However, loving attraction between male and 
female springing from sexual inclination and therefore tending to bodily 
union is, taking into account the body-spirit unity, a kind oflove specified 
by the very sexual tendency to bodily union. This implies this love to be 
specified by the naturally given condition of the body itself and therefore 
to be "procreative love" - love which has a "function", or better, a 
mission. 
So, "inseparable connection" of the two meanings signifies their 
reciprocal inclusive correlation. The bodily reality of procreation receives 
its fully human specification from spiritual love, and spiritual love of the 
married persons receives its specification as a determinate sort oflove from 
the procreative function of the body. 
Thus, for a correct and exhaustive understanding of the Inseparability 
Principle, it seems to be decisive to recognize that these two meanings are 
neither two meanings solely "added" one to the other nor merely two 
conjoined or accumulated "functions", each of which has its full 
intelligibility independently from the other. Rather, I should say, each one 
receives its full intelligibility as a human reality - its full human meaning 
- precisely from the other. Procreation considered independently from 
spiritual love is not the same thing anymore. And spiritual love tending to 
bodily umon between male and female considered apart from its 
34 Linacre Quarterly 
procreative meaning is not the same thing anymore either. This precisely is 
what follows from man's substantial body-spirit unity. 
If we consider things in this perspective of an anthropology which takes 
seriously the substantial unity of body and spirit, then the reason why these 
two meanings are inseparably connected becomes obvious: by separating 
them we would alter both the meaning of human procreation and the 
meaning of marital loving union. Both meanings are not extrinsically, but 
intrinsically connected. The very connection constitutes the specifically 
human content of both meanings. 
It may be useful to further stress the point I intended to make offering 
the foregoing exposition. "Humanae Vitae" speaks, in No. 12, about the 
inseparable connection of two meanings ("significatio") , and not of two 
functions of the marital act. Only a fertile sexual act can have a 
"procreative function ". An infertile act, however, may have a procreative 
meaning, if this act is intentionally open to procreation, though it will 
never have a procreative "function". "Procreative function" depends on 
actual fertility which, in a determinate moment, may be biologically given 
or not. Thus, to speak about "inseparability" of procreative and unitive 
"functions" would not make much sense, for only few sexual acts are 
"fertile" and actually have a procreative "function".18 Obviously, the 
procreative "function" can be entirely suppressed or separated from the 
love expressing "function". The Inseparability Principle, as stated by 
"Humanae Vitae", does not simply state that one is "not allowed" to do 
that, but that one cannot do it without destroying the very meaning of the 
marital act. The point is that "Humanae Vitae" speaks about an 
anthropological inseparability of the two meanings, which are not two 
functions but two aspects of the one and indivisible essence of the marital 
act. Therefore, "Humanae Vitae" calls the two meanings also "essential 
aspects" or "essential qualities" ("ultraque eius essentialis ratio ', of the 
marital act. In reality, both meanings together form one single, but 
complex unity of meaning, which is a true expression of man's substantial 
and therefore essential unity of body and spirit. 19 Only on these grounds, I 
think, is it possible to fully render justice to what "Humanae Vitae" affirms 
in No. 11: that every marital act, also those which are infertile and 
therefore obviously do not have a procreative "function", must be open to 
procreation, and must have a procreative meaning, which is inseparably 
connected with the unitive meaning.20 The Inseparability Principle, 
therefore, is not simply a re-formulation of a negative precept, but the very 
(anthropological) rationale which provides the reason why one cannot 
separate one meaning from the other without destroying the whole. 
Philosophically spoken, we may conclude therefrom that such a 
separation would be contrary to God's will and that, therefore, one may 
not realize it. 
From the Inseparability Principle derives the identification of the object 
of the marital act of sexual intercourse. The object of a human act (which is 
an act conceived as proceeding from deliberate will)'is its act-specifying 
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content. So called "moral objects" are the objects of the rationally guided 
will's choices to do something. Thus , objects of human acts are neither the 
naturally given goals of inclinations nor "things" we are acting about or 
aiming at , but rather, as Aquinas says, "!ormae a ratione conceptae".21 Or, 
using words of a contemporary author, "We must always remember that 
an object is not what what is aimed at is; the description under which it is 
aimed at is that under which it is called the object."22 Such descriptions 
under which actions are chosen are meant to be the intentional contents 0/ 
these actions; they refer to what one is doing when one does "this" on 
purpose. 23 
As we have seen, the human act of procreation essentially is an act of 
loving bodily union. Its unitive meaning is not just "one" meaning and the 
openness to procreation "another". It would be nonsense to say that 
sometimes spouses perform intercourse to express mutual love · and 
sometimes to procreate a new human life, or that sometimes they "do both 
things" together. What they deliberately choose (i.e ., the description under 
which their doing is chosen) is always one and the same: to give themselves 
with their whole spiritual, affective, emotional and sexual being to loving 
union (which, of course, physically is copulation; but "to copulate" surely 
is not the description under which normal couples choose copulation, 
hence, it is not to be called the "object of sexual intercourse"). Spouses give 
themselves to loving union whether procreation is actually intended or 
not. The reason for this is, every act of intercourse - even if the intention to 
procreate is the direct and explicit reason for actually engaging in 
intercourse - is by its very nature an act of loving union; procreation is 
effectuated just by loving mutual self-giving ofthe spouses in the totality of 
their body-spirit-unity. So every procreative act is expressing loving union. 
If, in the rather extreme case that sexual intercourse were performed 
without any mutual affection (exclusively for the sake of "making a baby", 
say), the act would be profoundly vitiated. When sexual intercourse, on 
the other hand , is performed in knowingly infertile periods , the meanings 
of the act are again the same: loving union , mutual self-giving of the 
spouses. If by physiological reasons, procreation was not possible and was 
even foreseen as such the objective meaning of the spouses' doing would 
not be affected by this. The reason is that what they intentionally do (what 
they "choose") is to engage in an act of loving bodily union which by its 
very nature serves procreation. The act they perform is a generative sort of 
act:24 even if it has not a procreative/unction (because of its being infertile), 
it nevertheless maintains its procreative meaning. If this act, for natural 
reasons beyond intention, cannot have procreative efficiency, this does not . 
alter what one intentionally does (what one chooses) as long as one did not 
do (choose) anything for preventing procreation. Human acts are specified 
by the object of one's will, and not by facts of nature which fall outside the 
reach of human choices. As has been already emphasized above, the two 
meanings of the marital act are two inseparable aspects of one object.25 
Consequently, an act of loving union which knowingly is infertile may, 
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considered as an intentional action, objectively be a procreative act. 
Therefore, the "object" of the conjugal act is neither "procreation" nor 
"expressing mutual love". We should rather define it as something like 
"loving bodily union" or "mutual self-giving in the totality of one's bodily-
spiritual being", taking into account, however, that "loving bodily union" 
has to be understood as "consummation of marital love", which obviously 
includes both the intentional openness to procreation (because of the very 
nature of the body as well as of the sexual character of marriage) and 
cooperation with God's creative love (because of procreation's involvement 
in God's creative love).26 What we have to define well, above all, is marital 
love. Then we will be able to rightly understand the object of marital 
intercourse as nothing other than the consummation of this love. Thus, 
conjugal acts would be altered in their objective meaning - in their very 
meaning as acts of "loving union" - just by intentionally excluding their 
openness to procreation. 27 
What have I shown up to this point? I have shown that intentional 
foreclosing of the procreative dimension of loving bodily union alters 
objectively the very nature of this union into a kind of "love" which is at 
odds with the anthropological truth of man. (It contradicts the substantial 
unity of body and spirit). In the context of our case, however, this is not a 
sufficient proof for the contention that contraception does in fact involve 
such a foreclosing. So, I wish to emphasize this: I have not yet proven that 
contraception is wrong. 
The reason for this is that our case is based on the presupposition that 
avoiding pregnancy is rightly demanded by procreative responsibility; that 
spouses ought to avoid conception now. On the grounds of this 
supposition, someone could rightly ask why, in order to meet this 
requirement while maintaining fully the procreative meaning of marital 
love in its totality, one should not be allowed to uncouple sexuality's 
procreative efficiency from its unitive function at least on the level of single 
performances of marital acts (i.e.,"sometimes", "occasionally" or 
"temporarily"). Contraceptive intercourse, then, would be supposed to 
receive its procreative meaning from the overall intention with which 
marital life is lived in its totality. "Why not", one could ask, "adopt 
contraception, given that we are bound to avoid pregnancy just for reasons 
of procreative responsibility?" "Why should the suppression of the 
procreative function of single sexual acts necessarily suppress also their 
procreative meaning, provided that contraception is chosen on the 
grounds of the very intention of responsibly serving the transmission of 
life?" "Why is this unity required to be maintained also on the level of 
single performances of conjugal acts?" And finally, "Why is only periodic 
continence, which means abstaining from those acts which are foreseen to 
have procreative consequences, the only upright behavior in order to live 
procreative responsibility under given circumstances? Is this claim not a 
piece of subtle hair-splitting; is this not mere sophistry, the only point of 
which could be seen in the rather abstract demand of respecting the 
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biological patterns inherent in human nature, a demand which, in the 
given situation, can hardly be made intelligible as a moral exigency?" 
Such questions actually show that appealing to the Inseparability 
Principle alone does not yet resolve the problem of contraception. We 
need a further argument to substantiate that contraception indeed does 
violate this principle in any case. That is, we need an argument which may 
elucidate that the Inseparability Principle is valid on the level of single 
performance of actions as well. So, some more action analysis is required. I 
shall have to show why contraception and periodic abstinence are two very 
different kinds of human behavior and why the former is not compatible 
with procreative responsibility while the latter is . This is equivalent to 
showing that contraception is incompatible with the objective meaning of 
single performances of the conjugal act, unless by doing this it could not be 
proven that the Inseparability Principle is a principle valid as well for 
judging each single performance of the conjugal act. To reject 
contraception on its grounds, it necessarily is required to be pointed out as 
such a principle, because otherwise resorting to it would simply be 
question-begging. 
For this purpose I will first have to say a few words about "procreative 
responsiblity". I wish to emphasize that only at this point are we entering 
into the proper perspective of natural law and at the same time into the 
perspective of moral virtue. 
2. 'Procreative Responsibility' 
Procreation in the realm of animals is steered by instinctive drives . 
According to the famous dictum of the Roman lawyer, Ulpian, "the 
natural inclination to the conjunction of male and female" is something 
"that nature has taught all animals", including man. Yet, with St. Thomas 
Aquinas , we have to add that nature did not teach all animals to follow this 
inclination under the guidance of reason and will , that is, to pursue it 
responsibly.28 Non-rational animals follow their instincts, and so they 
fulfill the will ofthe Creator. But man, the "rational animal", can fulfill this 
will only as a responsible agent, as the master of his own actions, as an 
"interpreter of God's will" , participating in the Creator's providence by his 
own acts of intelligent understanding. Exactly this active, intelligent 
participation in divine providence is what properly is called natural law. 
Man has to judge what is right or what is convenient to do. By simply 
following his instincts, he could not fulfill the will of his Creator. 
In the encyclical "Humanae Vitae", the following is said about 
"procreative responsibility" or "responsible parenthood" (No. 10): 
- one must know and observe the specific functions of the biological 
processes involved in procreation and that they belong to the human 
personality; 
- one must exert dominion by reason and will over one's "innate drives 
and emotions"; 
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- one has to judge responsibly one's own physical , economic, 
psychological and social conditions for being able to decide about either 
enlarging the family or renouncing having any more children for the time 
being or even for an indeterminate period. 
- spouses ought to integrate the means into the right moral order and to 
carry out their duties towards God, themselves , their family and human 
society. 
This description of what responsible parenthood is , also provides a very 
precise characterization of the virtue of chastity. Chastity does not simply 
mean continence, but mastery of one's own sexual drives so as to integrate 
them into the order of personal love. That is why according to Thomas 
Aquinas, chastity does not contradict what he calls an only "apparent 
incontinence" proceeding from "good concupiscence which is according to 
reason" J9 Indeed, normally sexual intercourse is elicited by spontaneDus 
sensual desire. That conjugal acts be "according to reason" does not 
require engagement in them on the grounds of rational deliberation 
(aiming at procreation or at rendering the marriage debt). This would be 
quite an unrealistic view. Fortunately, we need not subscribe to Benjamin 
Franklin's grimly utilitarian and puritan view, "Rarely use venery but for 
health and offspring". Conjugal love has its own spontaneity which yields 
from sexual inclination and the drives proper to it (which is quite different 
from "acting purely for pleasure"). What is required is habitual or virtual 
integration of this desire into the order of reason which is the order of 
human love. 
Besides the very important and often withheld fact that responsible 
parenthood may also lead the spouses to decide to enlarge their family, 
procreative responsibility basically means the morally upright and 
virtuous integration of sexual drives into the dominion of reason and will. 
It means following sexual inclination reasonably and, therefore, 
responsibly performing sexual acts as human acts guided by reason-
informed will. Thus, procreative responsibility means sexual behavior 
fully integrated in the requirements of spiritual life, a specific kind of 
virtuous self-control. . 
Procreative responsibility as part of the virtue of chastity is not 
compatible with any kind of such an integration. Being a virtue, it includes 
a kind of integration which corresponds to the anthropological truth of 
man as a body-spirit unity. The body and its sexual drives are not "nature" 
in the sense of nature which "surrounds" us, or which we are "living in" and 
"acting on". The body's sexual drives do not belong to such an object-
world of nature, but to nature which constitutes our own substantial being 
and , therefore, belongs to our own subjectivity. We are not spirits simply 
"placed in the environment of a body". We do not "have" a body, but we 
are bodies. Sexual drives of the body are called to be informed by spiritual 
life and , on the other hand, to be themselves subject of this spiritual life. 
This means: Acts of procreative responsibility do not consist in any kind of 
rationally and voluntarily "controlling", "guiding" or even "suppressing" 
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sexual drives. Sexuality is not a mere object of procreative responsibility, 
but must become its subject. Man's substantial unity requires that sexual 
behavior, the sexual acts themselves, be informed by the requirements of 
responsibility. 
This is what generally applies to the moral virtue of temperance to which 
chastity belongs. The virtue of temperance means tempering, modifying 
the very sensual appetites according to reason, neither "suppressing" them 
nor rendering them "harmless", but "impressing in them the seal of 
reason"30 and its requirements, so as to enable sensual appetites themselves 
to pursue what is according to reason, that is to say, according to 
responsibility.3) Moral virtue never consists in acts of repelling or 
suppressing sensual inclinations and their proper goods or goals. Such acts 
can be necessary as a part of the inner struggle by which a virtue is acquired 
or its possession preserved, but to conceive virtue itself in this way would 
be a rather spiritualistic conception of its nature, and therefore imply 
anthropological dualism. Acts of temperance thus and, consequently, of 
chastity and procreative responsibility will always be acts whose subject is 
the sensual appetite itself, modified in accordance with reason . They will 
be acts of sexual behavior, and this means acts in which not only is reason 
engaged in responsibility, but the whole human person, including its 
bodily dimension, is striving for those goods which, according to dictates 
of practical reason, the will pursues . Thus, they will be acts in which the 
body has the function of a principle of actions. 
The elaboration of this concept of procreative responsibility as an 
integral part of the virtue of chastity is the pivotal move towards a 
differentiation of contraceptive sexual behavior and sexual behavior in the 
context of periodic continence. This concept of procreative responsibility 
corresponds fully to the Inseparability Principle, but it enables us to bring 
this principle down to the level of single performances of sexual acts, to the 
level of concrete sexual behavior. Once we have understood sexual 
behavior as a subject and therefore an operative principle of procreative 
responsibility, and once we have made out that "openness to procreation", 
as a part of the objective content of the conjugal act, means "procreative 
responsibility", then we have settled the validity of the Inseparability 
Principle, not only on the level of the guiding intentions underlying marital 
love in its totality, but also on the level of single bodily unions in the 
conjugal act. For virtues are shaped by and aim at concrete performances 
of acts and their corresponding choices, and single acts and their 
corresponding choices are morally specified by their intentional contents 
which spring from the virtues to which they belong. This will become 
clearer when we proceed in the argument, analyzing now the difference 
between contraceptive intercourse and intercourse in the context of 
periodic continence precise~)i as two different kinds of sexual behavior. 
With this, we are arriving at the core of the argument. 
3. Contraceptive Sexual Behavior and Periodic Continence 
Therefore, only this third step contains the proper argument against 
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contraception. To detect the wrongness of the contraceptive choice, we 
have to start, however, with considering the practice of periodic 
continence. This, I think, is a necessary methodological requirement. In 
themselves , "failures" or evils of any kind have no intelligibility, for they 
have a privative character. Moralfailures, evils or vices are intelligible only 
through the light of the goods or virtues they oppose.32 So we have to 
consider first what spouses really do (and, therefore, choose) when they are 
responsibly practicing periodic continence. 
Spouses adopt the practice of periodic continence guided by a reason to 
avoid pregnancy which will induce them to refrain from sexual intercourse 
at times. They know that there are some periods in which intercourse is 
likely to lead to pregnancy, and others in which it is not. They are able 
(possibly with the help of an appropriate "method") to discern when the 
one or the other thing will be the case. But they know as well that the 
conjugal act is perfectly licit even if it is performed only for the reason of 
expressing mutual love. They will therefore abstain from intercourse 
during knowingly fertile periods and they will have intercourse only in 
periods which are foreseen to be infertile. Notice: the "method" (if ever 
adopted) in itself does not serve to avoid conception, nor does it prevent it. 
The "method" only provides some knowledge about fertility rhythms. 
What regulates conception is the act of abstaining from knowingly fertile 
intercourse. "Natural methods", independent from acts of continence, do 
not regulate anything. Thus , to speak comparatively about so-called 
"natural methods" and "artificial (contraceptive) methods" is entirely 
misleading. They are both "methods", but with an entirely different 
immediate aim, function, and outcome. In the case of "natural methods", 
the "method" itself is not essential; it only helps periodic continence to 
attain its purpose. In the case of contraception, as we will see, the 
"method" is just the "whole"; it is what essentially and sufficiently regulates 
conception by simply rendering sexual acts infertile. 
It is important to emphasize that in the given description of periodic 
continence not only one, but two different, although closely correlated 
actions of "sexual behavior" are included: both the performance of 
engaging in intercourse and the performance of continence (the act of 
refraining from intercourse) are authentic acts of sexual behavior. 
Moreover, the act of refraining is an action proceeding from a common 
decision of the spouses; both are engaged in abstaining from an action 
which is foreseen to effect conception. They realize their intention to avoid 
this by avoiding the performance ofthe act which would lead to it. This act 
of avoiding is a bodily act of procreative responsibility. It is not simply an 
"omission" in the sense of "not doing something", something purely 
"negative"; rather it is a determinate kind of action, that is to say, a 
deliberate human act of sexual behavior. 
Moreover, this act of refraining from intercourse is a real conjugal act. 
In it the two meanings of marital love are present. It is an act with a fully 
procreative meaning, because it is performed for reasons of procreative 
May, 1989 41 
responsibility. It actually is, by its very intentional content and thus 
objectively, an act of procreative responsibility. By abstaining from 
possibly fertile intercourse, spouses relate to sexual acts, to themselves and 
to each other, as a possible cause of new life . The respecting of their sexual 
activity as such a cause - and provided that they feel obliged not to beget a 
baby - precisely is the reason why they abstain from intercourse. 
Behaving alike, the spouses moreover act as two persons "united in one 
flesh" : their behavior proceeds from procreatively responsible continence 
have a proper marital and even parental meaning. They are acts of bodily 
constituted loving persons engaged in responsibly arising to the exigencies 
of their marital and parental vocation. In another way than intercourse 
itself, acts of responsibly abstainingfrom it are true expressions of both the 
procreative and the unitive meaning of sexuality, inseparably connected. 33 
The problems, burdens and difficulties possibly involved in a practice of 
periodic continence, to which its critics so often refer, have to be 
considered as the burdens and difficulties involved in faithfully carrying 
out marital commitment and not - as critics usually do - as something 
interfering with marital love. These burdens and difficulties may be 
overcome precisely by the fact that continence is an act of marital love in 
itself. The very nature of responsible abstinence includes the dynamic 
principle for overcoming these difficulties: this principle is just "marital 
love". By responsibly abstaining from intercourse, spouses only abstain 
from a determinate kind of bodily expression of mutual love; but they 
obviously do not abstain thereby from marital love and reciprocal self-
giving altogether. The common task of overcoming possible difficulties 
involved in practicing periodic continence will be a proper content and a 
fruitful touchstone of marital love. Within the context of the "logic" 
proper to periodic continence, what may seem a burden changes into a 
source of maturing in love and increasing mutual self-giving. Only on the 
background of an already deeply implanted contraceptive mentality, 
periodic continence may appear unreasonable . 
Sexual intercourse actually is not the only way of expressing marital 
love and it is not the only way of mutual self-giving; acts of continence will 
also share in this function if they are informed by responsible love. This is 
what is commonly overlooked. Equally often, one overlooks that sexual 
desire is not frustrated or spoiled by the fact of not actually being satisfied; 
just the contrary is the case. Responsibly abstaining from sexual 
intercourse does not involve forcing oneself to "stoic insensibility", 
shelving sexuality from marital life or even denying it. By the very act of 
responsibly refraining from its actual satisfaction, sexual desire is both 
affirmed and integrated into the "logic" of personal love. Thus it is 
affirmed as a human good to be pursued responsibly. 
On the other hand, sexual intercourse performed in this context of 
periodic abstinence during knowingly infertile periods is not only an act of 
loving union, but also an act which fully conserves its procreative meaning, 
because it is intentionally, and therefore "objectively", embedded in the 
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structure of procreative responsibility. The point I wish to make here is 
that these spouses live this responsibility by the means of their bodily 
love, by sexual behavior, modifying this behavior for reasons of 
responsibility. So sexuality, including its procreative dimension, is fully 
integrated into procreatively responsible behavior, into the life of the 
spirit. This operative integration is nothing other than the virtue of chastity 
as described above (see section II, 2). 
It seems, therefore, that chastity is bound to the condition of sexual 
intercourse never intentionally prevented from bearing procreative 
consequences; this, as it seems, is just what "Humanae Vitae" calls the "per 
se-openness to procreation". But notice: This is only a previous condition 
and not the rationale of the virtue of chastity. It is a condition made out as 
a condition just through providing a further argument which finally 
reveals its being a condition. 
Let me now consider contraceptive behavior. Contraception signifies 
that to avoid conception, sexual behavior need not be modified. Of course 
something in the behavior must be modified. There is required a certain 
discipline, from one of the spouses at least, in taking the pill, say, according 
to medical prescriptions (but this is incidental, as the case of sterilization 
and IUDs shows). In any event, sexuality, the sensual appetite or drive 
precisely, need not be modified (which, of course, is equally the point of 
onanistic orgasm achieved by "coitus interruptus"). 
Thus, while the former couple, by performing the bodily act of 
responsible continence, chose to avoid those acts which were foreseen to 
have procreative consequences, contraception signifies to choose an act 
which impedes possible procreative consequences of sexual intercourse. 
Thus on the level of performed sexual acts, spouses do not modify anything. 
-What they do is prevent these acts from being fertile so as to render 
needless responsible modification of sexual behavior. Unlike continence, 
this act of preventing sexual behavior from possibly procreative 
consequences is not in itself a sexual act; it is exclusively a "method" which 
only relates to sexual acts by preventing their procreative consequences. 
This clearly shows that the contraceptive act is not problematic because of 
its "unnatural" character (in the sense of "artificially" obstructing the 
natural process of ovulation or fecundation, which, as is obvious, does not 
happen in the case of "coitus interruptus"). Contraception is problematic 
precisely because of the fact that it renders needless a specific sexual 
behavior informed by procreative responsibility; it also involves a choice 
against virtuous self-control by continence. The act of procreative 
responsibility, in this case, is a pure act of deliberate will which treats 
sexuality and the body as its object (equal to a diseased liver, heart or 
digestive apparatus) . Consequently, sexual behavior itself is withdrawn 
from being informed by responsibility with regard to its being a cause of 
new life; in addition it is withdra wn from its being called to be subject and 
principle of this act of responsibility. Procreative responsibility of the 
sexual act itself is eliminated and denied. Sexual acts are impeded from 
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being a ca use of new life and the acting person is no longer acting as such a 
cause. Mostly in the case of sterilization, there is no need anymore of even 
thinking about procreative responsibility. The procreative dimension of 
marital love is entirely "off'. It remains the claim of thereby expressing 
marital love , but this love has altered its meaning by the very exclusion of 
its procreative meaning. So, the connection of the two meanings of marital 
intercourse has objectively been broken precisely on the level of 
intentional actions, on the level of the concrete sexual behavior one has 
deliberately chosen, and that is , on the level of single acts of contraceptive 
intercourse. 
Let me sum up. Contraception renders sexual acts to be acts without any 
procreative consequences. Acts whose foreseen procreative consequences 
have intentionally been prevented cannot be anymore procreatively 
responsible acts ;34 just for reasons of procreative responsibilty, they do not 
require anymore to be dominated by reason and will , which are the 
principles of human acts. So, sexual acts loose objectively their character 
of human acts of the species "procreative responsibility", while acts of 
periodic continence and of intercourse in this context fully maintain this 
character. 
Thus, insofar as the contraceptive choice involves intentionally rejecting 
procreative responsibility for one's sexual behavior, it also involves an 
anti-procreative volition. But it is specifically a peculiarity of man that he 
should integrate his sexual inclination and the acts deriving from it into the 
structures of responsibility and, thereby, into the life of the spirit. 
Contraception thus destroys the proper way in which human sexuality is 
meant to be a part of responsible human behavior. Instead of rising to the 
requirement of responsibility caring about what essentially is a cause of 
transmitting new life, spouses who contracept adopt a device which 
withdraws their sexual acts from being such a cause, with regard to the 
consequences of which responsible behavior is required . This is a 
fundamental attack on both the integrity of the human person as a 
body-spirit unity and on marital love which expresses this unity. 
Contraceptive intercourse is not an expression of marital love. In itself 
(disregarding the marital context), its point is nothing differs from the 
point of any other form of sexual activity, as mutual masturbation or 
sodomy. "It can't be the mere pattern of bodily behaviour in which the 
stimulation is procured that makes all the difference! But if such things are 
all right , it becomes perfectly impossible to see anything wrong with 
homosexual intercourse, for example. ( ... ) you will have no solid reason 
against these things".35 
What I have shown up to this point is that the contraceptive choice 
properly excludes a basic disposition of modifying one's sexual behavior 
for reasons of procreative responsibility. Thus, contraceptive intercourse 
is an act withdrawn from the logic of the procreative task ; intentionally it is 
not "open" anymore to procreation (and this means: objectively it is no 
longer open) while this is not the case in acts of periodic continence nor in 
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sexual intercourse performed in its context. Consequently both kinds of 
behavior have a very different intentional structure as far as procreation is 
concerned. Contraception indeed is contralife in the sense that it involves 
the negation of sexual behavior as a part of responsibility in regard to the 
task of transmitting human life. 
This may be less obvious in the very special, but theoretically possible 
case in which contraception is chosen exclusively for reasons of adopting a 
safer way of avoiding pregnancy. Nevertheless, in this case also one would 
choose against continence, though not with the intention of avoiding the 
possible "burden" of continence, but for the reason of aiming at security. 
But objectively, on the level of the sexual behavior in which one chooses to 
engage, continence, and thus responsible modification of sexual behavior, 
are equally excluded. In any event, this would not be the right way of 
making a choice; good (further) intentions do not justify wrong means. 
Whether an action which in itself actually does have a proper moral 
content and relevance (which therefore is not indifferens ex specie) is a 
good means for carrying out a determinate purpose, has to be settled 
independently from intentions however good and justified they may be. 
This view seems to be confirmed by what the II Vatican Council's 
Pastoral Constitution "Gaudium et spes" has established as a basic moral 
criterion for responsible parenthood: 
.. . when there is a question of harmonizing conjugal love with the responsible 
transmission of life, the moral aspect of any procedure does not depend solely on 
sincere intentions or on an evaluation of motives. It must be determined by 
objective standards. These, based on the nature of the human person and his or 
her acts. preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human procreation in 
the context of true love. Such a goal cannot be achieved unless the virtue of 
conjugal chastity is sincerely practiced (No . 51). 
N ow we can recognize the importance of an often overlooked passage in 
"Humanae Vitae" in the final paragraph of its No. 16: Periodic abstinence 
and contraception, the encyclical affirms, are two radically different kinds 
of behavior. At a first glance, the substantiating of this claim looks rather 
deceiving and odd: "In the former, married couples rightly use a facility 
provided them by nature. In the latter they obstruct the natural 
development of the generative process." 
Again, it seems that the reason given for the wrongness of contraception 
is its unnatural character, its lack of respect for naturally given patterns. 
However, according to the encyclical's wording this is not yet a moral 
judgment, but only the description of the action about which a moral 
judgment has to be given . The rationale for this moral judgment (and 
therefore the rationale of the intentional content of the described action) is 
provided only in the following sentence: The reason why it is licit to restrict 
oneself to performing intercourse only during infertile periods, the 
encyclical says, is that in this case, during fertile periods, spouses perform 
acts of abstaining from intercourse. Let us cite the text (the emphasis is 
mine): 
May, 1989 45 
It cannot be d enied that in each case marri ed co uples . for acce pta ble reaso ns. are 
both perfectly clea r in their intention to avo id children and mean to ma ke sure 
that none will be bo rn . But it is equa lly true Ihal il is exclusivelr in Ihe(ormer case 
Ihal husband and '\'lIe are ready 10 ahslain (,se .. . abslinere valeam') from 
imercourse during Iheferrile period as ofte n as for reaso na ble mot ives the birth of 
another child is not desirable . 
This " readiness to a bstain from intercourse" is equal to at least an implicit 
choice of modifying one's sexual behavio r for reasons of procreative 
responsibilty; it refers to a fundamental and decisive disposition. So 
"Humanae Vitae" seems to ass ume the following: For discovering what is 
wrong with contraception, one must not concentrate on questions like: 
'What's wrong with obstructing the procreative process in having its 
natural course?' The question which has to be asked rather is: "What is 
wrong with procreative responsibility carried out by rendering modifi-
cation of one's sexual behavior needless and even useless?" Or, put in 
another way, "What is wrong with a choice for avoiding pregnancy which 
excludes the choice of modifying one's bodily behavior?" For that, 
precisely, is the point of contraception. In the light of this sort of questions 
only , the attempt to interfere with natural processes by preventing 
conception manifests itself as a moral problem. Unless one realizes that 
contraception opposes the requirements of virtuously carrying out 
procreative responsibility, one will not be able to substantia te why the act 
of preventing conception implies moral fault. 
This moral fault then consists in withdrawing the body from the context 
of responsibility, treating it as a mere "object to be regulated" instead of 
re~pecting it as part of the "regulating acting subject", that is, as a principle 
of humari acts. With this , the inner truth of the human person as a 
substantial unity of body and spirit and the body-spirit-unity of marital 
love are, in their very integrity, attacked by a specific sort of behavior, by 
concrete performances of single acts: Contraceptive intercourse regarded 
as an intentional action is another sort of sexual act than sexual 
intercou.lse in the context of periodic continence. 
As I have shown, this intent to withdraw sexuality from the context of 
procreative responsibility is equal with acting against the virtue of chastity 
which implies virtuous self-control. This, as it seems to me, is the leading 
perspective underlying the teaching of "Humanae Vitae," already 
announced in the final paragraph of No.2 and finally settled in No. 21 . It is 
the perspective present also in John Paul II's allocutions about " Humanae 
Vitae" (see his Wednesday audiences from May to November, 1984). 
4. Intrinsic implications of contraception: Disintegration of sexuality and 
of marital love 
The way of arguing adopted so far to substantiate this claim may be 
considered as rather abstract and complicated . But, I think , once its 
leading insight has been grasped , it turns out to be very plain. Moreover, it 
has a strong intuitive appeal. If one explains to contracepting people what 
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they are doing when they contracept, just by making them aware of what 
they would do instead if they practiced periodic continence, then they are 
enabled to immediately grasp what they are failing to do by adopting 
contraception. To give evidence concerning vices, one has to talk about 
virtues . Intuitive awareness of many people that something is wrong with 
contraception (or even their often unconsciously feeling ashamed about 
their behavior), is based on the "silent presence" of the demands of natural 
law in human conscience , whose voice, of course, may be silenced in some 
degree. This demand of natural law present in human conscience is 
precisely the insight into the requirements of the virtue of chastity, 
connected with the consciousness of one's dignity as a bodily constituted 
person. 
There are some other aspects deriving from this analysis, which will 
finally show what really is at stake and how profound is the moral disorder 
involved in contraception. As we have seen, the act of abstaining from 
intercourse within periodic continence is an act common to both spouses 
who are united as two persons in one flesh and live a common vocation in 
serving responsibly the transmission of human life . Yet, a contracepting 
couple also undermines this kind of communion. Contraception does not 
need common agreement and very often it is adopted against the will of 
one of the spouses. Theoretically this could happen also with periodic 
continence. But even if contracepting spouses do agree, this agreement has 
no bodily expression; sexual behavior remains untouched from this 
common policy. Once contraception is chosen, the care for procreative 
responsibility informs bodily behavior no longer. It need no longer be a 
content offurther dialogue and common decisions as long as contraceptiYe 
behavior is not abandoned. It vanishes from conjugal life, the bodily 
dimension of which comes to be concentrated in sex as a means for 
expressing "love" deprived from its procreative meaning. 
This may engender very different consequences, and which of them will 
be brought about and in what degree they may occur depends on 
contingent factors extrinsic to contraception itself. In any event" with the 
adoption of contraception, something objectively decisive has changed . 
There is now a principle of disintegration of marital love at work. This 
principle of disintegration consists of the peculiarity of sensual appetite 
which by its own nature is directed only to actual satisfaction and self-
gratification. The "logic" of spiritual love and the "logic" of sensual 
appetite are very different; sexuality needs to be operati',ely integrated into 
the "logic of the spirit"; only then does it become a specific human and 
bodily expression of spiritual love, and only then will it promote 
community of persons. 36 Disintegration of sexuality, however, brought 
about by contraception, introduces in marital love a kind of "sensual 
heteronomy": Besides its self-gratifying character, sensual appetite in itself 
has no continuance in time; it tends to decrease in the same measure as it is 
gratified. Thus, however, if a beloved person is only an object of sexual 
desire, then it is experienced as worthless in the same measure as sexual 
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desire is satisfied. Moreover, on its own sensual pleasure does not establish 
communion, but rather isolation and loneliness. For it is not self-
transcendent to another person, but rather self-centered. By his subjective 
experience of sensual pleasure alone, the person is not able to distinguish 
this experience from real personal love, the expression of which it should 
be. Sensual appetite, moreover, can never strive for the "good of the 
other", but only for "its own good"; it is , by its own nature, not able to 
increase "love of friendship". So, disintegrated ( or isolated) sexuality is not 
a principle of union of two persons. To say it in a clearer way, it tends to 
create a fictitious union by transforming spouses into accomplices of 
common masturbation. This fictitious character of contraceptive ~ 
intercourse is not basically different from the one implied in onanism by 
"coitus interruptus". And even if the immediate context is different, it has a 
striking similarity with solitary sexY . 
What is lacking is precisely "the task" or "mission" of sexuality which is ~ 
able to work as a principle of transcending and "elevating" mere sensuality. , 
integrating it in the life of the spirit. 38 There exists a problematic gap 
between spiritual love as mutual self-giving of two persons to each other 
and the claim to express and to nourish this love by acts of sexual pleasure 
and satisfaction, which by their own nature tend only to self-gratification. 
This satisfaction and this pleasure involved in bodily love are very good 
and entirely human things . But they need to be integrated into the 
structure of spiritual love and this is hardly possible without the link of a 
principle of spiritual love able to inform sexuality itself, giving it a meaning 
within the context of spiritual love, a direction towards the "logic of the 
spirit" by integrating it into the "conjugal good" (Finnis). Such a principle 
should belong to both , spiritual love and sexuality.)t is precisely the link 
established by the procreative task , whose requirements also inform acts of 
responsibly refraining from intercourse , but not contraceptive conjugal 
acts . 
The conclusion seems obvious. Sexuality and its pleasure, uncoupled 
from their procreative meaning, are no longer able to serve for the 
expression of mutual, self-giving love between man and woman. 
Disintegrated sexuality is something like a "time bomb"; it acquires a 
destructive force and operates like a principle of corrosion of true love. 
There exists much clinically observed empirical evidence on this provided 
by psychopathology. So we have to defend the procreative meaning of 
sexual intercourse precisely in order to defend its unitive meaning. And we 
may state again: Both meanings are inseparably connected and 
reciprocally related to each other. 
I believe that by this way of arguing one can easily understand the still 
important difference between couples who illicitly exclude the procreative 
good of marriage, one by adopting contraception and the other by 
practicing (though illicitly) periodic abstinence. The difference is that in 
the latter case the procreative dimension of sexual acts continues to be a 
principle which informs bodily behavior, so there is less peril of sexuality's 
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disintegration. Sexual acts are related to as something that is a possible 
cause of new life and therefore has to be responsibly performed . Thus, 
spouses still are aware that they have to account for the possible 
procreative consequences of their sexual acts. Therefore, even if they 
practice periodic continence illicitly, they precisely do not do this with a 
" ~ "contraceptive mentality". Obviously, a fortiori this applies to a couple 
who, rightly and withjust reasons, practice periodic continence. If, against 
their intention to avoid having a baby, conception nevertheless occurs, 
,~ 
then the child will not be an "unwanted child" in the proper sense. More or 
less, but surely in some way, they will feel responsible for this new life 
which comes into being. At least they willfeel obliged to accept it. because 
they know that it is the consequence oftheir being a possible cause of new 
life and therefore of what they did or failed to abstain from . Contracepting 
spouses, on the other hand, whose policy fails (which may happen), will 
not feel responsible for the new life they have begotten, because they have 
chosen a line of action which intentionally excludes their being a possible 
cause of new life and therefore equally excludes their having to accountfor 
the procreative consequences of one's sexual acts. The new human life 
coming to be is frustrating their very choice of adopting contraception. 
This contraceptive mentality, which is truly contra-life, is what generates 
the so called abortion mentality. Where contraceptive behavior spreads, 
the number of abortions increases. What makes this mentality so 
destructively aggressive is precisely the fact that it proceeds from a mental 
attitude which intentionally excludes the responsibility for the procreative 
consequences of one's sexual behavior. For this very reason it may be 
called a contra-life attitude. 39 
Please note that this applies equally to extra-marital sexual intercourse 
or fornication. Couples who are not married have a very strong reason for 
avoiding the procreative consequences of their mutual love. This reason is 
to not cause the initiation of new life outside marriage, which would be the 
most irresponsible thing of all. Thus, as far as contraception is concerned, 
the same principles apply to them. But periodic continence is excluded as 
well, since the unitive meaning of sexual intercourse is fulfilled only within 
the context of marital commitment. Marital commitment is nothing but 
the very truth of sexuality itself, and sexual intercourse is the 
consummation of this marital love. Thus, mutual love of a couple not yet 
united in marital commitment cannot be adequately expressed in sexual 
intercourse. Therefore, outside of marriage, chastity requires absolute 
continence. 
5. Contraception and Natural Law 
To sum up: Contraception is wrong because it involves a type of sexual 
behavior which is inconsistent with procreative responsibility. This 
inconsistency is due to the fact that contraceptive sexual behavior destroys 
the behavioral unity of body and spirit. Destruction of this unity implies 
both to withdraw sexuality from its procreative meaning and to therefore 
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di sintegrate sex ua lit y so that it cannot be any lo nger a true expression of 
perso nal love . Thus , contraceptive behavior includes features specific to 
other forms of disintegrated sexuality like onanism and masturbation . 
Being similar to these forms of sexual self-gratification, contraceptive 
intercourse is not mutual self-giving of the persons, but rather a principle 
which undermines the communion of persons. Insofar as it is practiced 
within marriage , contraceptive behavior additionally opposes the union of 
two persons in one flesh committed to responsibl y serving the transmission 
of human life . 
What I have exposed is a Natural-Law argument against contraception. 
It consisted , first, in an anthropological anaiJ 'sis olfhe subsfantial unify of 
man as a compound being of body and spirit which shows the meaning of 
the Inseparability Principle . Second, on these grounds I have elucidated 
"procreative responsibility" as a moral I'irrue which enabled us to apply 
the Inseparability Principle to concrete performances of actions. Third , I 
have analyzed contracepfive behavior as essentially different from 
periodic continence and as being opposed to moral virtue in general, and 
to procreative responsibility in particular, proving thereby that 
contraceptive intercourse indeed is incompatible with the Inseparability 
Principle and therefore with the "truth about man". Fourth , I have shown 
fhe intrinsic implicafions 0/ confracepfion/or marifallove. which shows 
the real gravity of the moral disorder involved in contraception . This 
argument, which stresses the personalistic features of the virtue of chastity, 
fully conforms, I think , to the leading perspective involved in the teaching 
of " Humanae Vitae". It finally provides an answer to the last question I 
intended to deal with: " Why and in which precise sense can contraception 
be called a violation of natural law?" 
What is natural law? It is, as I understand it, the order established by 
human reason in man's natural inclinations.40 These inclinations are given 
by nature , as e.g., the natural inclination to the conjunction of male and 
female . But this inclination, although being natural and, as a created 
reality, a participation in the eternal law of the Creator, is not yet natural 
law. For "law" is a binding guide or rule to performing right aCfions 
proceeding from reason and will. Natural law, rather, is the order 0/ 
pracfical reason established in this inclination, which includes and 
presupposes that practical reason has already grasped this natural 
inclination as a human good to be pursued within the order of reason.41 In 
our case, this order of reason is the order of loving, mutual self-giving and 
procreative responsibilty, both inseparably connected , an order established 
in the sexual drives . Spouses who modify their sexual behavior according 
to the demands of procreative responsibility act according to natural law; 
they live the virtue of chastity (for natural law makes us live the virtues). 
In the case of contraception, the situation is quite different: Here the 
entire natural inclination to conjunction of male and female is withdrawn 
from the context of procreation and the requirement of being ordered by 
reason of being dominated by reason-informed will. It is withdrawn 
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from the requirement of virtuous self-control. Of course, as I have already 
remarked above, the adoption of a contraceptive policy is also a kind of 
rational and voluntary dominion and "control" over sexuality. But it is not 
a kind of virtuous dominion; that is to say, it is not a dominion which 
conforms to the anthropological truth ofthe substantial unity of the body 
and the spirit, because it is not a sort of dominion which informs sexual 
acts, but dominion that only refers to procreative consequences of sexual 
acts; thus , in themselves they need not anymore be considered as a possible 
cause of new life and need not, therefore, be responsibly modified . 
Contraceptive dominion, rather, is a kind of "technical" dominion over the 
possible cause of new life and over the human drives which lead to 
effectively causing it. Contraceptive behavior produces a profound 
alienation of the personal selffrom its body, because it treats the body - in 
a "technical" way - as a mere object, destroying its subjectivity character. 
So, in the originally spiritual act of mutual self-giving effectuated in the 
conjugal act, contracepting spouses do not give themselves anymore in 
their totality as bodily beings.42 We could interpret this act in two different 
ways, though neither of them is satisfactory: spouses either perform an act 
of spiritual love by merely using their bodies (each one their own and the 
one of the other) as something like an instrument for expressing this love 
or they perform a mere bodily act which is not informed by spiritual love 
and , therefore, tends to be mere self-gratification. The former is what 
contracepted sexuality intends to be; the latter is what it actually tends to 
become. In any case, contraceptionjalsifies sexuality. 
When talking about "technical" dominion I do not want to refer to the 
"artificial" character of most contraceptive techniques as opposed to 
"natural". "Technical" behavior, rather, means a kind of behavior as 
opposed to "virtuolfs" behavior. The facilities of artificial devices only render 
easier and "technical" behavior more tempting. Its wrongness, however, does 
not consist in its artificiality, but rather in its fundamental "amorality" in its 
denial of the requirements of moral virtue. In the case of contraception, this 
denial is - by its very structure: objectively - absolute and radical. Thus, it 
contradicts the basic requirement of a natural law-guided human behavior. 
Contraception not only signifies acting against some determinate precept of 
natural law, but rather it withdraws sexual inclination from the requirement 
of being informed by natural law at all. It eliminates at its very root the 
ordering efficiency of natural law, which includes human reason, reason-
guided freedom and freedom's responsibility. It leads to a bodi~v behavior in 
which the "image of God" is no longer present , and therefore it is a sort of 
behavior inappropriate to fulfill that to which marital love essentially is 
called: to cooperate with God's creative life-giving love. I think that is what 
the encyclical "Humanae Vitae" wanted to teach us. The sadly obvious 
consequences of contraceptive behavior - some of them mentioned in No. 
17 of the encyclical - may show that this teaching was truly prophetical, 
even if its prophetical truth will be misjudged exactly in the same measure as 
procreative irresponsibility spreads. 
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I have treated the problem of contraception from a strictly philosophical 
viewpoint. Therefore, I did not deal with theological and pastoral 
questions. In any event, pastoral care has to take its measure from the 
"truth about man". And moral theology should not only respect, but 
integrate the philosophical (anthropological and ethical) insight about 
man as a moral agent. 43 Practical demands which spring from this "truth 
about man" may be considered as hard. The alternative to respecting this 
truth, however, is even much harder; it is not a desirable alternative. The 
Church always has taught that - in the given situation of fallen mankind 
- all the exigencies of natural law cannot be fulfilled except by the help of 
redeeming grace which, as far as human weakness is concerned, has a 
healing power. Thus, the truth may be hard, but the means offered by the 
Church to overcome this hardship are most efficient. They permit man not 
only to strive for sanctity, but to fully develop thereby his very humanity. 
This striving always has been the seal of authentic Christian life, which is 
not the least also called to defend worldly goods such as sexuality, human 
love and marriage against their depravation by a world marked by sin and 
the human weakness springing from it. The Church's mission is not to 
condemn anybody, but to illuminate man's conscience and to 
simultaneously offer God's mercy and grace, - faithful to the mission of 
the Christ Who has been sent by the Father not to judge this world, but to 
save it. 44 
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